Toward a theory of second-order corruption by Zyglidopoulos, Stelios
  
 
 
 
Zyglidopoulos, S. (2015) Toward a theory of second-order 
corruption. Journal of Management Inquiry 
 
Copyright © 2015 The Author 
  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s)  
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details must be given 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/103785/ 
 
 
 
  Deposited on: 28 May 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
 1 
Towards a theory of second-order corruption 
 
Stelios Zyglidopoulos 
Adam Smith Business School 
University of Glasgow, Main Building,  
Glasgow, G12 8QQ, Scotland, UK   
Tel: 44 (0) 141 330 3993 
E-mail: szyglidopoulos@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Paper accepted for publication with the Journal of Management Inquiry 
 On March 4 2015 
 
 
  
 2 
 
Towards a theory of second-order corruption 
Abstract 
In this paper, I identify two kinds of corruption: first-order and second-order 
corruption. First-order corruption is the abuse of power by either individuals or 
groups for private gain, given a system of existing rules or norms; whereas second-
order corruption is the abuse of power by individuals or groups in that they change the 
existing rules or norms in order to benefit from them unfairly. I argue that second-
order corruption has certain unique characteristics that make it harder to identify and 
more harmful for both the corporation and society in the long run, and conclude by 
suggesting some ways to deal with it. 
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Towards a theory of second-order corruption1 
 
Transparency International (2011) defines corruption “as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” and, based on this understanding, many authors 
have applied similar definitions of corruption in fields of both management and 
politics. Within the field of management, Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi (2004, p. 40) 
see corruption as the “misuse of an organizational position or authority for personal 
gain” and others agree that corruption involves the violation of rules for personal or 
group gain (Clarke, 1983; Williams, 2000). In the field of politics, Bratsis (2003) 
defines corruption as the subversion of the public good by private self-interest. 
Underlying all these rather similar definitions of corruption and fundamental to the 
way many management and political science scholars use the concept is the notion of 
‘abuse of power’. 
 In this paper, drawing on the possible interpretations of this ‘abuse of power’, 
I argue that two kinds of corruption, which I refer to as first-order corruption and 
second-order corruption, can be identified. First-order corruption is the abuse of 
power by either individuals or groups for private gain, given a system of existing rules 
or norms, whereas second-order corruption is the abuse of power by individuals or 
groups in that they change the existing rules or norms in order to unfairly benefit from 
them. For example, when an executive lies about the profitability of her corporation 
so that she can receive a greater bonus at the end of the year, she engages in first-
order corruption. However, when the same executive uses her power on the board of 
directors to arrange her compensation rules in such a way that she always receives a 
bonus regardless of her performance as head of the corporation, she engages in 
                                                 
1 The author would like to help Paul Hirsch and two anonymous reviewers for their support and 
constructive comments in earlier versions of this manuscript. 
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second-order corruption, because this use of a bonus contradicts its main purpose, the 
alignment of the financial interests of the executive with the interests of the 
corporation’s shareholders. In other words, in the first case she breaks the rules, 
whereas in the second she shapes (re-writes) them in such a way that they unfairly 
benefit her. 
 Second-order corruption is important because of certain unique characteristics 
it has that make it harder to identify and more harmful for the corporation and society 
in the long run. First, second-order corruption is subtler than first-order corruption, 
which makes it harder to detect. Second, it tends to be systematically invisible, either 
because it has a cover of legality or because it is hidden behind many other complex 
rules and procedures. Third, second-order corruption can be much more 
serious/central than first-order corruption because those who can engage in it – those 
who can influence the rules so that they receive an unfair advantage – are almost 
always very high up in the food chain and would be unlikely to engage in second-
order corruption for trivial sums or matters. Moreover, second-order corruption often 
plays a central role in the building of unethical systems within business organisations. 
Second-order corruption can therefore be more harmful and has to be dealt with 
separately from first-order corruption. 
 In order to theoretically explore and develop this notion of second-order 
corruption, in the remainder of this paper, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the 
different kinds of interpretations of the term ‘abuse of power’, which is crucial for our 
understanding of the notion of corruption and leads us to the differentiation of 
corruption into first- and second-order types. Second, I discuss in more depth the 
unique characteristics of second-order corruption and identify the problems to which 
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these characteristics lead. I conclude by discussing the possible ways that second-
order corruption can (and should) be identified and dealt with. 
 
Abuse of Power and Kinds of Corruption 
 Let us start our discussion of the notion of ‘abuse of power’ by presenting 
three cases of corruption within organisations. 
 Case 1: A sales person post-dates to early January some order cancellations 
she received in late December, which would impact the sales target she had achieved 
for that calendar year, so that she does not lose her bonus, based on net sales. 
 Case 2: A production manager chooses to buy for his company system X from 
supplier A because the representative of supplier A bribed him. System Y from 
supplier B would have been better, but because both systems are technologically 
complex, the production manager can use his technological expertise to deceive his 
non-expert colleagues and superiors into believing that system X is really better. 
 Case 3: The CEO and a couple of other senior executives hide the losses that 
their corporation suffered during a particular year by engaging in creative accounting, 
Enron style, so that their company’s share price appreciates in the stock market and 
they can cash in their stock options for a profit. 
 
 In all of these cases, we can see that the abuse of power for personal gain is 
central to what these individuals did wrong. In case 1, the sales person should not 
have post-dated the dates of the order cancellations she received in December, but she 
has the power to do so, given that it was highly unlikely that anybody would check 
with the customers to verify the exact date on which they made their cancellations. In 
case 2, the production manager uses the power that his technical expertise gives him 
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to confuse and mislead his non-technical colleagues into believing that the system of 
the company that had bribed him is the best, when it is not. In case 3, the CEO and her 
fellow executives use their power over their firm’s accounting procedures to hide their 
losses from the stock market so that they can cash in their stock options for a profit. In 
short, in all of the above examples of corruption, we see individuals abusing their 
position of power in a corporation for their own benefit.  
 However, in all three cases above, we also see that the individuals who abuse 
their power do so within an existing set of rules or norms. In case 1, the sales person 
breaks the corporate rule that says she should enter an order cancellation into her log 
as soon as she receives it. In case 2, the production manager breaks the unspoken 
norm or tacit contractual obligation that he should be using his technical expertise for 
the benefit of the corporation’s purchases. In case 3, the executives break the contract 
that they have with their shareholders that they will act in good faith in the interest of 
the shareholders. In other words, in all three cases, the individuals involved use their 
power to break an explicit or implicit rule or norm for personal gain. 
 This kind of corruption, where individuals abuse their power within a given 
system of rules, laws or norms, by either breaking them or interpreting them in their 
favour, falls within my definition of first-order corruption. Let us consider the 
following cases of second-order corruption, when individuals use their power to 
change (or create new) rules, laws or norms, which unfairly favour themselves.  
 
 Case 4: A sales manager, whose company is in the business of providing long-
term energy contracts, convinces his superiors that mark-to-market2 accounting 
                                                 
2 An important difference of mark-to-market accounting compared to conventional accounting is the 
following. Under conventional accounting, revenues, costs and profits are recorded when they occur. 
Under mark-to-market accounting, one can record all of the estimated value of the profit of, for 
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should be used to calculate the profits from the sales his team makes. Based on these 
profits, the sales manager and his team can pocket their bonuses on company profits 
that will not really materialise for years to come and are based on assumptions about 
an uncertain future.3 
 Case 5:  A production manager has to write the technological specifications 
for a new production system that her company intends to purchase. The choice is 
between three systems, X, Y, and Z, and she can write the technological specifications 
in ways that provide X, Y or Z with an advantage if she wants to. Her choice, 
however, will lock in the corporation for the long term. After the initial investment 
has been made, it would be too costly to change systems, so the corporation will have 
to continue buying system upgrades and spare parts from the supplier initially chosen. 
Now system X would have been the most appropriate system, but the production 
manager, who is close to retirement, chooses system Y because of her contacts with 
company Y, which have promised her a cushy consulting job with one of their 
subsidiaries in his retirement. 
 Case 6: A company’s board meets to discuss the perks that executives should 
be entitled to after retirement. However, a great number of the company’s board 
members are also active firm executives and most are close to retirement. In addition, 
the board is dominated by its president, who also happens to be the CEO of the 
company and has personally brought in most of the members of the board, insiders 
and outsiders. He is arguing that an executive retiring from the company should 
receive an additional number of perks including use of the company jet, use of a 
number of company properties around the country, financial planning assistance and 
so on. He is arguing for such perks not because he thinks such rewards would be 
                                                                                                                                            
instance a twenty-year project, on the day the deal is signed. This is exactly what Enron did for all of 
its long-term contracts (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 39).  
3 Any similarity with the Enron case is intentional. 
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beneficial to the company in any way, but because he is close to retirement himself 
and he does not want to lose the perks he has been used to. Of course, he does not say 
so, but comes up with some rationale to justify his proposal. Now the remainder of the 
board members, who have for a long time been dominated by the current CEO-
President, do not agree with the rationale, but are not indifferent to the perks the 
package includes for them. Given that it would also take a great deal of effort to 
oppose the current CEO-President, they all agree that this is an appropriate retirement 
package for senior corporate executives. 
 
 The second set of cases (4, 5 and 6) is in one sense similar to the first set (1, 2 
and 3), but differs in another. The similarity is that in both sets of cases what 
constitutes corruption is the fact that individuals abuse their power for personal gain. 
However, while in the first set of cases the individuals involved break existing rules 
and norms, in the second set of cases, the individuals involved use their power to 
create new rules and norms that unfairly favour them personally, immediately and in 
the future. For instance, in case 4, the sales manager abuses his power by changing the 
accounting system used by his company so that in future contracts he and his team 
can benefit from profits that might never materialise. Or in case 5, the production 
manager abuses her power by writing the specifications, which will bind her company 
in the future, in such a way that she will unfairly benefit from this at the expense of 
her company. Whereas in case 6, the CEO-President and the other senior executives 
on the board abuse their power by designing the rules guiding the retirement packages 
of senior executives so that they unfairly keep many of the perks they have been used 
to at the expense of the firms’ shareholders. 
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 In what ways does second-order corruption differ from first-order corruption? 
And why does it matter? In the following section, I address these issues and 
subsequently argue that because of its characteristics, second-order corruption can be 
more damaging than first-order corruption, in the long run. 
 
Characteristics of Second-order Corruption 
 Second-order corruption has at least three interconnected and often mutually 
reinforcing characteristics that differentiate it from first-order corruption: (1) subtlety, 
(2) systematic invisibility and (3) severity/centrality. In short, I argue that second-
order corruption is subtler, consistently invisible, and more severe than its first-order 
relative and often central in the making of organisations into unethical systems.   
 First, second-order corruption is subtler because it is harder to detect and/or 
understand. For example in case 1, detecting that the sales person benefits from post-
dating the order cancellations received in December to January is easy, only requiring 
an audit on when particular customers, who apparently cancelled their orders in 
January, actually did cancel their orders. However, in case 4, detecting how a mark to 
market accounting system opens the door for many overvaluations of long-term 
projects is less straightforward. It involves the evaluation of a number of assumptions 
included in the calculations of complex, long-term deals. Similarly, in case 3, 
understanding how managers misreported their firm’s financial results can be 
understood after an elaborate audit, because the process of reporting financial results 
is rather structured. Therefore, by comparing how the firm’s financials were reported 
with how they should have been reported, even if this involves an elaborate and 
complicated audit, one can understand in the end what exactly the managers did 
wrong. On the other hand, though, in case 6 where the firm’s executives decide on the 
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rules that should guide their retirement packages, the process is rather unstructured 
and there are no formal guidelines on how such a discussion should be conducted to 
compare with the actual discussion that took place. Moreover, the ‘abuse of power,’ in 
changing the rules and the ‘private (unfair) gain’ are in second-order corruption often 
separated in time, which makes its detection even harder. For example, in case 5, the 
writer of the technological specs does not benefit from her abuse of power until she 
retires, years later, and the same applies for cases 4 and 6. In short, second-order 
corruption is harder to perceive and understand because it often involves the 
construction of rules regulating complex, long-term projects through unstructured 
processes and because it is broken down in actions across time that become corruption 
only if taken together. It requires then a long-term perspective to perceive, given that 
its consequences have a longer-term impact. 
 Second, second-order corruption is systematically invisible, mostly to 
outsiders, in the sense that even if it is not subtle, it is consistently hidden. This could 
result from the fact that these rules, which unfairly favour those who designed them, 
are either legal or illegal but their illegal nature is well hidden from scrutiny. The 
legality of a given rule or regulation can stem either from the process through which it 
was developed or from the consequences resulting from its application. Therefore, if 
one wants to determine the legality (or not) of a given rule, one has to examine the 
process through which it was created and its consequences. In the case where a 
particular rule, which was designed to unfairly to benefit its designers, is legal, this 
means that its consequences are not illegal and the process followed in its design was 
the appropriate one. So, the systematic invisibility of second-order corruption stems 
from the fact that no one is likely to look twice at rules designed appropriately with no 
obvious illegal consequences. In other words, the unfairness of the rule is well hidden 
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in its legality. For example, in cases 4, 5 and 6 above, the individuals involved were 
able to create new unfair but legal rules by taking advantage of the subtlety and 
unstructured nature of the situation. However, second-order corruption can be present 
even when individuals abuse their positions of power to design unfair and patently 
illegal rules, which they hide by complicating the processes through which the illegal 
and unfair nature of what they did could be discovered. For example, in the Enron and 
WorldCom cases, the executives involved had designed and followed some clearly 
illegal rules and regulations, but they had also created a system of, often, legal rules, 
regulations and bureaucratic procedures that complicated the detection of second-
order corruption. In other words, an important characteristic of second-order 
corruption is its systematic invisibility because it is either ‘legal’ or even if illegal, it 
is well hidden through the creation of an extraordinary level of systematic 
complication, which obscures transparency.  
 Third, another important characteristic of second-order corruption is its 
severity/centrality, where by severity I mean the negative impact that the particular 
corrupt act or acts have on those treated unfairly, and centrality the impact it can have 
for other corrupt acts. In other words, second-order corruption is more severe than its 
first-order relative because it is not a one-off incident, but opens the door for many 
such incidents. For example, comparing case 1 with case 4 above, we can see that 
while in case 1, the sales person abuses her power once, in case 4, the individuals 
involved are able to use the new rules of the game to repeatedly gain unfairly from 
many such incidents. Or, comparing case 3 with case 5, we can see that while in case 
3 the engineer unfairly influences her company’s purchases once, in case 5, she 
influences her company’s purchases for the foreseeable future, as long as the specs 
she wrote remain in use. Therefore, the severity of the corruption in cases 4 and 5 is 
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greater as it can continue indefinitely, whereas in cases 1 and 3, the harm done, no 
matter how great, is a one-off event. Moreover, second-order corruption, as we saw in 
the Enron and WorldCom cases, can be very central and crucial in creating an 
unethical system, where the whole organisation becomes corrupt. As McLean and 
Elkind (2004) report for Enron: 
“… the government was no longer focusing on narrow illegal acts. Instead, it 
was making the case that Enron was fundamentally a fraud – and it didn’t 
matter if this particular accounting move, or that one, was technically legal. 
Taken in its entirety, Enron’s accounting practices violated the law because they 
perpetuated fraud” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 414). 
In other words, the centrality/severity of second-order corruption can be 
explained by its ability to expand its impact on the actions of innocent individuals 
not breaking any rules, technically speaking. Second-order corruption can entangle 
in corrupt activities individuals, who are innocent participants (Zyglidopoulos & 
Fleming, 2008) in corrupt activities by following certain unfairly created rules and 
regulations without being aware of the corrupt implications of their actions 
(Messick & Bazerman, 1996). And as Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008) have 
suggested innocent participants can easily become rationalizers of corrupt 
activities, especially when the ethical consequences of their actions are not readily 
visible to them, thus influencing the norms and cultures of organizations to 
facilitate corrupt activities.  
 
Consequences of Second-order Corruption 
 Because of these characteristics, second-order corruption has potentially more 
serious consequences than its first-order relative: (1) second-order corruption can 
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have a substantial impact on the proliferation of overall corruption across hierarchical 
levels, (2) it can have greater negative consequences, (3) it can lead to an escalation of 
increasingly unfair rules and regulations and (4) it is harder to stop. 
(1) Second-order corruption can have a substantial impact on the 
proliferation of overall corruption across hierarchical levels. If second-order 
corruption exists in organisations, it is most likely to exist at the top because it is the 
top executives and board members who formulate the rules and regulations that make 
organisations function. Given the direct and indirect effects that the ethical behaviour 
of organisational leaders can have across different hierarchical levels (Schaubroeck et 
al., 2012), second-order corruption can significantly influence corruption at lower 
organisational levels. For example, top executives, through acting as ethical role 
models for middle managers (Brown & Treviño, 2006), can influence the behaviour 
of these managers, who might also engage in first- or second-order corruption. And 
top executives can have a lasting effect on the overall corruption levels of an 
organisation by having an effect on the moral standards embedded in the 
organisational culture (Schaubroeck et al., 2012). Moreover, by engaging in second-
order corruption, top executives limit their ability to implement ethical values for the 
rest of the organisation even if they try to do so, because they will be perceived as 
hypocritical leaders, who while not moral themselves, try to impose moral standards 
on others (Trevino & Brown, 2004) and organisational members are likely to imitate 
what they see or deduce that their leaders are doing, rather than what they are saying. 
 (2) Second-order corruption can have greater negative consequences.  The 
negative consequences of second-order corruption are much greater than those of 
first-order for a number of reasons. First, second-order corruption is more severe 
because it is on going and has the potential to cumulatively cause more harm than 
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first-order corruption. Second, those involved in second-order corruption must have 
access to the making of new rules and laws or the changing of old ones. This 
necessarily means individuals who hold senior positions in the corporation, are 
wealthy and have considerable power, which also means that they would not bother to 
engage in second-order corruption for insignificant sums of money or benefits. In 
other words, irrespective of its possible cumulative harm, one should expect second-
order instances of corruption to be more serious than first-order. 
 (3) Second-order corruption can lead to an escalation of increasingly 
unfair rules and laws. The main reason for this possible escalation of corruption 
through a series of increasingly unfair rules is a phenomenon that has been labelled as 
‘shifting baseline syndrome’4. The shifting baseline syndrome was first introduced by 
Pauly (1995) in the study of fisheries to partly explain the disastrous deterioration of 
fish stocks around the world: 
 
“Essentially, this syndrome has arisen because each generation of fisheries 
scientists accepts as a baseline the stock size and species composition that 
occurred at the beginning of their careers, and uses this to evaluate changes. 
When the next generation starts its career, the stocks have further declined, but 
it is the stocks at that time that serve as a new baseline. The result obviously is a 
gradual shift of the baseline, a gradual accommodation of the creeping 
disappearance of resource species…” (Pauly, 1995, p. 430) 
 
 In the case of second-order corruption, a shifting baseline syndrome operates 
in a similar way and can also lead to an escalation of corruption in corporations. For 
                                                 
4 I would like to thank Guido Palazzo for introducing me to the concept of the shifting baseline 
syndrome. 
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example, in case 6, let us assume that the board of directors agrees on a particular 
level of unfair perks for retiring executives. This unfair level of perks, if not 
challenged, becomes the new baseline which subsequent generations of boards use to 
evaluate their proposed changes. If these subsequent directors increase even slightly 
the already unfair rules about the perks allowed to retiring executives, these new rules 
become the new baseline for subsequent directors, and so on. In other words, even if 
each generation of directors unfairly changes the rules even slightly in their favour, 
the cumulative impact over time can be dramatic and lead to an escalation that might 
not even be visible to the directors themselves because they cannot see beyond their 
own term (across generations). 
(4) It is harder to stop second-order corruption. In order to stop any kind of 
corrupt activity, reason suggests that three conditions must be met: first, one has to 
detect the underlying abuse of power in the particular action(s), second, one has to be 
able to revise the formal rules and regulations so that such actions are not possible in 
the future, and third, one has to change the informal norms and values of the firm that 
encourage and/or tolerate such actions. I argue that in cases of second-order 
corruption, it is harder to meet these conditions. 
First, the detection of second-order corruption is harder for a number of 
reasons. Second-order corruption is often involved in the construction of rules 
regulating complex projects, unstructured processes and is broken down in actions 
spread across time, which often hide the abuse of power involved from immediate 
sight. In other words, its subtlety and systematic invisibility make it harder to detect. 
Moreover, the rules and regulations, which usually guide us in such cases, are not 
reliable in a situation where they are not being explicitly broken, but are constructed 
with a particular bias in mind. 
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Second, it is also harder to stop, because it involves a revision of existing rules 
and regulations, a revision that is often cumbersome. In addition, those who did abuse 
their position of power to create such unfair laws and regulations in the first place 
might still be in power or be involved in the revision process and they might oppose 
the revision of the existing rules, which benefit them unfairly, and/or sabotage the 
revision even if it takes place. In first-order corruption, the breaking of the rules or 
laws triggers disciplinary procedures of varying intensity, which more often than not 
remove the guilty parties from their posts. However, this is not the case in second-
order corruption, where often no rules were broken and no disciplinary procedures 
were triggered to remove the individuals responsible from their posts. Moreover, 
given the possible centrality of second-order corruption, such a revision would be 
quite cumbersome, as it would also involve revising many other rules and regulations. 
 Third, revising the norms and values, which encourage and/or tolerate second-
order corruption is often hard because these values and norms are embedded in an 
organisation’s ethical culture, the shared understandings of organisational members 
regarding ethical conduct (Trevino, 1986, 1990) and they have become normalised 
with time (Anand et al., 2004; Spicer, 2009). According to Schaubroeck et al. (2012), 
organisational leaders can directly and indirectly influence the ethical culture of their 
organisation. In particular, these researchers found that organisational leaders 
influence both the ethical conduct and beliefs of their immediate followers and that of 
followers at lower hierarchical levels by influencing the ethical behaviour and beliefs 
of their subordinate leaders. In short, leaders can influence the ethical culture of their 
organisation across and within organisational levels (Schaubroeck et al., 2012), a 
finding particularly relevant for second-order corruption because if it happens, it 
happens almost exclusively at the top of the organisational pyramid. 
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How to deal with second-order corruption 
 Given the above characteristics and consequences of second-order corruption, 
detecting and stopping it are not easy tasks. A brief look into the history of political 
philosophy can easily tell us that the threat of second-order corruption has been with 
us for a very long time, at least since the time of the Ancient Greek philosophers. 
However, even if dealing with second-order corruption is not an easy task, given its 
seriousness, we should keep trying to deal with it as best we can. Therefore, having no 
illusion that these suggestions permanently solve the problem of second-order 
corruption, I offer in this section a few suggestions on how corporations should deal 
with second-order corruption. In brief, I identify and discuss three ways, which 
separately or (better) in conjunction, can help corporations prevent, detect and stop 
second-order corruption. These are related to regulations, moral cognition and moral 
conation (Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011). 
 Starting with corporate regulations, corporations might consider a periodic 
review of their rules and regulations through a zero-based approach. In a sense what I 
propose here is very similar to what in financial management is called ‘zero-based 
budgeting’. Zero-based budgeting “requires each manager to justify his/her budget 
request as though the organisational functions were starting from ‘ground zero’” 
(Flamholtz, 1983, p. 166). What I propose is that corporations might want to 
periodically review the rules and regulations concerning the benefits of different 
individuals, i.e. managers, executives, different kinds of specialists and so on, as if the 
firm were starting for the first time. In other words, executives, the Board of Directors 
or even the firm’s shareholders might want to ask a task committee, which would 
have to include a substantial portion of disinterested outsiders, to review the firm’s 
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functions and businesses and propose which rules would make sense to them, if the 
corporation were to start from scratch, without including in their deliberation the rules 
and regulations the firm actually has at the moment. Large discrepancies between the 
rules guiding the benefits of individuals that a zero-based review proposes and 
existing ones might indicate that second-order corruption has accumulated unnoticed 
into the firm’s regulatory edifice and with time came to be considered normal (Anand 
et al., 2004; Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2008; Palmer, 2008; Spicer, 2009). 
 In proposing the above, I draw on Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial 
spectator. Adam Smith introduced the concept of the impartial spectator in his book 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 2010) to enable individuals to make 
impartial but informed decisions. Smith proposed that, faced with a moral decision, 
one should imagine what an impartial spectator observing one’s actions at a distance 
would say. This way, Smith argued, one uses all the relevant information in one’s 
possession and at the same time through the distance imagined for the impartial 
spectator one can also approximate impartiality/disinterest (Broadie, 2006). 
The application of the notion of the impartial spectator is not new to the 
corporate world, with the difference that real individuals are used. One could argue 
that when firms use auditing firms to ensure the accuracy of their financial reports, 
they are actually using the idea of a real impartial spectator. However, in order for 
corporations to be able to better deal with second-order corruption, I would 
recommend that the notion of the impartial spectator be also used for periodic 
reviewing of existing rules and also in auditing the rationale behind proposed changes 
to existing or new rules. In other words, while the concept of the impartial spectator is 
currently used in the governance of corporations to ensure that firm executives and 
accountants comply with existing – mostly financial – rules and norms, it should also 
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be applied to audit the rule-making function of corporations, using a zero-based 
approach. 
 Second, coming to matters of moral cognition, there are two ways through 
which business organisations and the individuals within them can address second-
order corruption. These are: (1) making the rationales behind proposed regulatory 
changes explicit, and (2) simplifying these rationales to the greatest extent possible.  
 (1) Making the rationales behind proposed regulatory changes explicit. In 
many cases, second-order corruption results from the fact that the rationales behind 
proposed regulatory changes are not clear. For example, in case 4 above, the rationale 
as to why a mark-to-market accounting procedure should be the most appropriate for 
long-term engineering projects was not made explicit. The same applies to cases 5 and 
6. If, through debate, more effort had been given to making the rationales behind such 
regulatory changes more explicit, it is more likely that the second-order corruption 
element of the decision would have become more obvious. 
 (2) Simplifying these rationales to the greatest degree possible. Given that 
technical complexities can be used to hide the real rationales behind changes in 
regulations, with Enron being a paradigmatic case in this respect, executives should 
be pressured into simplifying their rationales to the greatest degree possible. Of 
course, there are some technical matters that cannot be simplified beyond a certain 
point, matters which only specialists can understand. However, if the general rationale 
of the proposed change is separated from the technical arguments supporting it, then 
impartial outsiders, including individuals with and without technical training, can 
easily evaluate both. 
 Third, organisations can try to address second-order corruption through 
improving the moral conation of their managers. According to Hannah et al. (2011), 
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moral conation refers to the impetus to act with moral purpose and results from moral 
ownership, moral efficacy and moral courage. They view moral ownership as the 
sense of ownership and responsibility that an individual feels towards a particular 
moral target; moral efficacy as an individual’s belief in her capabilities to organise 
and mobilise her resources to attain moral performance; and moral courage, in brief, 
as the character strength to commit to her moral principles in spite of the adverse 
pressures and dangers involved in doing so.  
 The moral ownership, efficacy and courage of managers can help 
organisations prevent, detect and stop second-order corruption in different ways. 
Moral ownership can prevent executives, board members or managers from not 
identifying the moral implications of the matter and their responsibilities in it, because 
as Trevino and Brown (2004, p. 70) note, “decision makers may not always recognize 
that they are facing a moral issue”. For example, in case 4 above, moral ownership 
might help the sales manager to identify the possible moral consequences of his 
decision to choose a particular form of accounting, as this form could provide the 
temptation and opportunity to salespeople to exaggerate expected profits in their 
favour. Moral efficacy can motivate executives or managers to use their resources to 
achieve a set of rules or norms conceptualised with the appropriate criteria in mind. In 
case 5 above, the production manager would decide which technological system her 
corporation should be locked into based on performance/cost criteria and not her 
(personal) potential future rewards. Finally, moral courage can be very instrumental in 
getting individuals within groups to speak up for their beliefs, even though they might 
be penalised for doing so, because, as Trevino and Brown (2004) point out, even if 
individuals decide on what is right, it is not always easy to do so. In case 6, for 
example, in discussing the future perks of retired executives, a member of the board 
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would need exceptional moral courage to stand up to the domineering president/CEO 
and argue that the retirement perks proposed were excessive and not in favour of the 
shareholders, or more broadly, the corporation’s stakeholders. 
 It is therefore reasonable to suggest that corporations invest in developing 
these aspects of moral conation. Organisations can do so by raising awareness of the 
possibility of second-order corruption, through training programmes reinforcing 
appropriate practices and values, by developing ethical organisational cultures and by 
reinforcing ethical leadership. 
 Moreover, organisations could try through their promotion practices to make 
sure that the individuals who make it to the top and might have the opportunity to 
engage in second-order corruption are all ‘principled,’ to use the term from the theory 
of cognitive moral development described by Kohlberg (1969). According to this 
theory, individuals tend to develop from childhood to adulthood through a sequence 
of five hierarchical cognitive stages, which determine how they think about ethical 
dilemmas. Within this framework, moral reasoning becomes more complex and 
sophisticated as the individual progresses from early to later stages. Of course, not all 
individuals make it to these higher stages, which Kohlberg considers as “morally 
better,” as they are consistent with our understanding of justice and rights. However, 
it is not the purpose of this paper to review Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral 
development. For our purposes, it suffices to say that it is only individuals who make 
it to the highest and fifth stage5 of moral development that Kohlberg refers to as 
“principled”, and make ethical decisions based on justice and rights principles, who 
are least likely to be tempted to engage in second-order corruption, given the 
                                                 
5 The other four stages are: (1) where individuals decide on what is right or wrong based on 
punishment avoidance, (2) where individuals focus on getting a fair deal in exchanges, (3) where 
individuals are conforming to the expectations of significant others, and (4) where individuals decide 
on what is wrong or right based on the society’s rules (Kohlberg, 1969). 
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opportunity. Therefore, organisations should aim, as far as possible, for those who 
reach top executive positions to have morally developed to a “principled” level. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Second-order corruption, as developed here, has certain similarities and is 
related with some notions of corruption from the field of political science, such as the 
notion of meta-corruption (Martinot, 2005), the role of the administrative regime in 
post-soviet Russia (Sakwa, 2010) and secondary corruption (Werlin, 2002). Meta-
corruption, according to Martinot (2005), is the “acceptance and valorization of an 
underlying corruption” (2005, p. 107) and he illustrates what he means by referring to 
the acceptance by both political parties of computerized voting machines, which 
compromised transparency and the openness of tallying procedures in the 2004 US 
Presidential elections. A more similar concept to second-order corruption is the 
description by Sakwa (2010) of how, operating within the administrative regime of 
the state, “political actors bend structures and rules for their own ends” (2010, p. 192), 
in post-soviet Russia. Moreover, the notion of second-order corruption is related to 
some extent to the notion of secondary corruption (Werlin, 2002), who uses it to refer 
to a government’s inability to control “excessive partisanship or greed,” which he 
refers to as primary corruption, in democratic politics (2002, p. 347).  
There are also a number of theoretical implications following from the notion of 
second-order corruption discussed in this paper. First, the relevant literature does 
not always make a clear and useful distinction between first- and second-order 
corruption, with too much research attention been accorded to first-order 
corruption. Second, second-order corruption can be seen as influencing the overall 
corruption of organizations through a number of theoretical perspectives. For 
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example, within a bounded rationality framework (Simon, 1979), individual 
decisions leading to corrupt actions can be investigated as resulting from second-
order corruption that staged the social system in a way that deprived these 
individuals of complete information. Or, following what De Graaf (2007) refers to 
as ‘bad apples’ theories, one can explain organizational corruption as resulting 
from a few bad apples, who designed the rules in unfair ways. Third, second-order 
corruption has implications for the study of political corruption within democratic 
politics because it can focus our research attention on the corrupting potential of 
the criterion of deciding the who should construct the laws and regulations guiding 
political processes, what Warren (2004, pg. 328) refers to as the “dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion within democratic politics.” 
 In conclusion in this paper, I have introduced the concept of second-order 
corruption as the abuse of power by individuals or groups to change the existing (or 
create new) rules or norms so that they can benefit from them unfairly. I have also 
argued that second-order corruption is very important because it is harder to identify, 
it is more harmful over the long run and is harder prevent, detect and stop. Finally, I 
have presented some proposals that might help corporations in dealing with second-
order corruption. While I am under no illusion that my suggestions can permanently 
solve the problem of second-order corruption, I hope they may provide some help to 
business organisations in dealing with this problem. 
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